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Abstract
Many people do not regard violence against them as a crime, but the factors that influence
this response are unknown. Understanding how the ‘crimeworthiness’ of violence is
interpreted allows an insight into how victims make sense of their experience, how
communities influence attitudes towards victimisation and the reporting of crime to the
police. A pooled cross-sectional sample of respondents to the Crime Survey for England and
Wales was used to identify factors associated with the decision to label or discount a violent
incident as a crime. Individual and neighbourhood-level effects were estimated using
multilevel modelling. Harm, the perceived unjustness of the incident and victim-offender
relational distance predicted labelling, while frequency of victimisation and victim initiation
of the incident predicted discounting. Neighbourhood and neighbourhood crime had little
effect on victims’ interpretations of the ‘crimeworthiness’ of violence. When victims interpret
violence against them, they appear to do so unencumbered by social norms, but are
influenced by the impact of the violence, the ‘prototypicality’ of the incident as a crime and
their previous experience of violence.




Criminal incidents are not objective phenomena: what is a crime to one person may not seem
like a crime to another. That individuals vary in what they interpret as a crime is a central
tenet of the sociology of law, but the reasons for this variability are not understood. In the
few instances when the decision to ‘label’ something as a crime has been discussed, the focus
has largely been on constructing and resisting ‘victimhood’ identities (Weiss, 2011) or
exploring whether some currently legal behaviour should be criminalised (Nielsen, 2000). It
appears that no research has been undertaken to identify the individual and contextual
factors that constitute a crime. Gaining an understanding of crime labelling is important for
understanding how victims make sense of their experiences, for understanding victim
behaviour such as reporting to the police and for providing insight into the socially
constructed nature of crime. Focusing on violence, this paper seeks to identify factors that
predict when an incident will be labelled as a crime – and, correspondingly, to predict when
it will not. In essence, it seeks to identify the principal components of violent crime in the
eyes of those who have experienced violence.
The relevance of ‘crime labelling’
Labelling an incident as a crime is the first step in the use of law (Black, 1979). Before a
victim of violence reports the incident to the police, they must decide that it is a crime, i.e.
“worthy of police attention” (Black, 1979, p. 20). This simple cognitive step provides can
insight into the use of formal and informal methods of social control, to improving police
ascertainment of crime, to understanding the ‘dark figure’ of crime, to increasing access to
victim services, to understanding the democratic processes that influence the use of and
changes in criminal law and to understanding the constructed nature of crime. As labelling
exists only in the mind of the victim, it is free of implications for that victim, while reporting
is not. As reporting crime is a behaviour, bringing with it consequences and uncertainty as
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well as motivational and logistical barriers, the factors that predict reporting cannot be
generalised to be the factors that predict labelling.
It is important to draw a distinction between the use of the term ‘crime labelling’ in this
context and the alternative use of the term ‘labelling’ in criminology, as used by Lemert
(1951), Becker (1963) and others. Both approaches are concerned with the role of labels in
the interpretation of the world. Where they differ is their chronological approach to the
construct. The more common use of the term (as used by Lemert and Becker) is primarily
interested in the consequences of attaching a label to a phenomenon. Importantly, the
process of studying this labelling begins after the label has been attached. This paper,
however, is interested in the factors that precede and influence the attachment of a label –
crime – to a very specific phenomenon, violence. The difference between the two
approaches, therefore, is that the one employed in this study treats labelling as the
phenomenon to be observed, while the other is concerned with labelling as active agent or
mechanism that operates upon the world. In this study, respondents did not actively identify
themselves as victims of crime or, without prompting, label violence against them as a crime;
they responded to a question about their experience of violence and made a decision about
whether they regarded the violence as a crime.
Theoretical background
Many studies have addressed victims’ behavioural responses to crime, including avoidance
(Baumgartner, 1988; Kilpatrick and Acierno, 2003), violent retaliation (Anderson, 1999;
Felson and Steadman, 1983) and reporting – or not reporting – to the police (Skogan, 1984;
Brennan, 2011), but these studies have generally implied that victims actually regard the
violence as a criminal incident. As the concept of ‘crime labelling’ is novel, it lacks a
theoretical basis from which to launch an empirical exploration. As the use of law is a
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consequence of labelling crime, it is possible that models of reporting crime can be translated
into models of labelling crime. In one of the few theoretical models that can be applied to
crime labelling, Ruback, Greenberg and Westcott (1984; see Figure 1) proposed that victims’
decisions about crime are informed by two interacting and simultaneous factors: the impact
of the incident on them and the extent to which the incident fits their model of what
constitutes a crime, hereafter ‘crime prototypicality’. This model is starting point for this
paper’s exploration of the ‘crime labelling’ phenomenon.
Figure one about here
Informed by Janoff-Bulman and Frieze (1983), Ruback et al. (1984) proposed that the
impact of the crime is felt through several mechanisms: the harm or potential harm caused
by the incident, the perceived injustice of the incident and the victim’s perceived future
vulnerability. The preference here for the term ‘impact’ over the more common ‘harm’ is
important as it emphasises the extent to which an incident can affect an individual both
immediately and prospectively.
While their initial model focused on the incident as either legal or illegal, Ruback and
colleague’s later work showed that the prototypicality of an incident is informed by more
than this simple dichotomy. Using a series of vignette studies, they demonstrated that
offender characteristics, victim characteristics, precipitatory factors and incident
characteristics all contributed to hypothetical decisions about crime (Greenberg and Ruback,
1992; Ruback, 1994; Ruback et al., 2004; Ruback et al., 1999; Ruback and Thompson, 2001).
Later work found that a victim’s construction of their ‘victimhood’ (Dunn, 2008) and their
own prototypicality as a victim (Loseke, 2007; Zaykowski, in press) can also affect the
labelling process. Therefore, ‘crime prototypicality’ reflects not just the respondent’s
objective view of the legality of the event, but also their subjective understanding of how
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worthy such an incident is of the use of law (Black, 1979) and the ‘affront’ to their
personhood that the incident represents.
Predictors of crime prototypicality and impact
While the above model is a potentially valuable framework for understanding response to
crime, it does not identify the specific factors that might influence this response. The most
suitable model from which specific predictions can be made is Black’s theory of law (1976).
This theory seeks to explain variations in how individuals use law, such as why victims report
or do not report victimisation to the police. Although not all parts of Black’s theory have been
shown to have predictive validity (Gottfredson and Hindelang, 1979; discussed further
below), the combination of the models proposed by Black and Ruback et al. (1986) are a
valuable starting point from which to explore what constitutes crime for those who
experience violence.
Black (1976) suggested that the use of law was influenced by relative social distance
(stratification), relational distance (morphology), level of education (culture), victim group
size (organisation) and desire to exercise social control. Importantly, the ‘pure sociological’
theory did not accommodate the seriousness of the incident, the effect of contextual factors
such as incident location or internal factors such as victim attribution of blame. When the
theory was tested by Gottfredson and Hindelang (1979) using victimisation survey data, the
results, which offered little support for Black’s theory, suggested that the failure to account
for incident seriousness was a significant limitation. In the years since Black proposed his
theory, incident seriousness, measured in a variety of ways, has been recognised as one of the
few consistent predictors of the use of law. However, Black’s theory should not be discounted
entirely. His proposal that the likelihood of victim’s use of law is proportional to the
relational distance between victim and offender has received considerable empirical support
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as many studies have reported an unwillingness among victims to report the violence of their
partners, families and friends (Gottfredson and Hindelang, 1979; Felson et al., 1999). A
rational explanation of the observed phenomenon is that victims do not want to deal with the
consequences of reporting, but – as has been demonstrated in the domestic abuse literature
(Weiss, 2011) – it is also possible that this type of violence simply does not fit their prototype
of a crime.
It is likely that the respondent’s narrative of the violent event will have some impact on their
interpretation of the incident (Gergen and Gergen, 1983). Therefore, their explanation of the
cause of the incident will provide some insight into their understanding of the ‘justness’ of
the violence. In the aftermath of violence, victims may attribute the cause of the incident to a
range of different factors, such as bad luck, their own recklessness or an offender’s violent
disposition. Therefore, informed by Black (1976), victims are most likely to feel aggrieved by
the incident when the violence was ‘unbalanced’ (i.e. they were victimised by more than one
person) and when they were singled out as a target. These components combined constitute
the ‘unfairness’ of the incident.
A mechanism of crime labelling and discounting
Many victims of crime do not regard offences against them as a crime (Hough and Mayhew,
1983). In the context of violence, this is an important point. Being pushed, hit, kicked or
assaulted in some other way to the extent that it is memorable is likely to reach the legal
threshold for assault. Therefore, the gap between an assault being regarded as a crime
(labelled) and not a crime (discounted) is filled with subjectivity. As suggested by Ruback et
al. (1984), for crime discounters, the incident does not fit their prototype of ‘a crime’, it has
caused them little harm or offence and it has done little to change their view of their own
vulnerability or their view of the world. The event is therefore of little seriousness and can be
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disregarded. In these cases, it is proposed that the mechanism through which this has
occurred is one of ‘normalisation’1.
Normalisation of victimisation. Violence between two adolescents is often regarded as
less ‘crimeworthy’ than violence involving an adult (Finkelhor and Ormrod, 2001). While
this may be unsurprising, it is important to ask why this is the case. One potential
explanation for this phenomenon is that of normativity. If fighting is regarded as a normal
part of adolescent life and learning to deal with conflict is part of the maturing process,
labelling the violence as a crime becomes inefficient. However, there are limits to this
discounting approach; some violence is too serious, harmful, frequent or unusual to ignore,
although the criteria for this decision are not defined. If such tacit rules exist for judging the
‘crime prototypicality’ of adolescent victimisation, it is likely that such a set of rules also exist
for adult victims.
As with all learned concepts, an individual’s prototype of crime is informed by their
experiences and social norms. It is reasonable to expect that these prototypes can result in
differing interpretations of what constitutes a crime: as Young has noted, “what seems trivial
to some would be serious to others” (1988: 173). The effect of most stimuli dulls with
repeated experience. Lottery winners eventually return to their prior levels of happiness
(Brickman et al. 1978) and the quality of life of some (but not all) recently disabled people
returns to its pre-injury levels (Diener et al., 2006). Similarly, repeated exposure to violence
is associated with a reduced perceived significance of future violence (Garbarino, 1995). This
phenomenon is known by several names including desensitisation, pathologic adaptation or
normalisation and may explain differences in the labelling of some assaults. By this rationale
– assuming similar levels of harm – over time, repeat victims will start to rate assault as less
serious of less of a crime.
1 A further mechanism used by victims, ‘neutralisation’, is discussed in the final section of this paper,
but the available data prevent this mechanism being explored.
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Even among those for whom experiencing violence is not normal, there is little doubt that
the context of an assaultive action affects how it is interpreted (Black, 1979; Young, 1988).
Code-based explanations of criminal etiquette, enforced at the social group level and
experience at the individual level, may provide a useful insight here into understanding
victim attitudes and behaviours. Just as a willingness to use violence in certain contexts can
increase an individual’s social standing in violent subcultures, perhaps stoicism in the face of
assault can do the same (Anderson, 1999). Åkerström (2002) has detailed how care workers
do not interpret the regular violence they suffer at work as crimes and there is a substantial
body of literature on nurse’s discounting attitudes towards work-related assaults (e.g. Levin,
Hewitt and Misner, 1998; Smith-Pittman and McKoy, 1999). Whether this discounting is out
of loyalty to patients, sympathy, pragmatism or an implicit code of conduct remains to be
seen. Nevertheless, that this reticence appears to be commonplace suggests that there is a
normative attitude towards violence in certain contexts.
This reluctance to label violence as a crime is mirrored in other contexts. Anderson (1999)
reported an avoidance of law among deprived communities despite high levels of crime. In
these neighbourhoods, social norms ensure that a tendency towards showing ‘heart’ trumped
a tendency towards authority. Ellickson’s (1991) study of conflict resolution in a rural
community demonstrated that efficient “informal norms of neighbourliness” (p.viii) can
trump legal norms when all members of a group cooperate. Unfortunately, the single-
community samples upon which Ellickson and Anderson based their research do not permit
generalisation to a wider population. However, it is feasible to test whether the discounting
of violence by victims is normalised in consistent across neighbourhoods and related to the
level of crime in those neighbourhoods.
It is not clear whether the discounting of legality in these communities was the product of
bottom-up interpersonal cooperation or that of top-down normative social pressure. If it was
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the former, then it provides support for Black’s theory of relational distance. If it was the
latter, it suggests some form of informal social control within a cluster or community. Both
of these positions can be tested empirically.
Using models of crime reporting, this study seeks to identify the factors that predict crime
labelling. Previous research has suggested that, for victims, crime is a combination of the
impact of the incident on the victim (harm, unjustness and feelings of vulnerability) and the
extent to which the incident matches their prototype of a crime (legality and context) and
that the decision to label these incidents as a crime is informed by personal experience and
social norms. Based on the evidence presented above, which has explored decision-making
about crime at individual and social levels and considered precipitatory, event-level and
consequential factors, the following hypotheses are proposed.
Hypotheses
H1: Likelihood of crime labelling is positively related to the amount of incident harm
H2: Likelihood of crime labelling is positively related to the unjustness of the incident
H3: Likelihood of crime labelling is positively related to victim feelings of vulnerability
H4: Likelihood of crime labelling is proportional to relational distance between victim and
offender(s)
H5: Likelihood of crime labelling is negatively related to experience of violence
H6: Likelihood of crime labelling is clustered within neighbourhoods





The initial sample was all respondents to the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW)
between 2008/09 and 2010/11. The CSEW is a nationally representative survey of English
and Welsh respondents’ experience of crime in the twelve months preceding completion of
the survey. Details of the CSEW sampling procedures are available in Bolling et al. (2007),
Nicholas et al. (2007) and Fitzpatrick and Grant (2011).
Inclusion criteria were that survey respondents were aged 16 years or over and living in a
household, as opposed, for example, to being homeless or living in a communal
establishment, such as a hospital or prison and respondents answered yes to the question:
“has anyone, including people you know well, deliberately hit you with their fists or with a
weapon of any sort or kicked you or used force or violence in any other way?”.
CSEW data sets for the years 2008/09 to 2010/11 (Home Office Research, Development and
Statistics Directorate and BMRB Social Research, 2010 a,b; 2012 a–d) were extracted
electronically from the UK Data Service (http://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/). Lower-level
geographical data were obtained under a special license agreement with the UK Data
Archive. In this data set, lower-level superoutput area (LSOA) codes represented
neighbourhoods (Office for National Statistics, nd). The LSOA is the best proxy for
neighbourhood captured in currently available administrative datasets, with an average
population of 1,500 residents.
Three sweeps of the CSEW were pooled to maximise the sample of relatively rare events
(violent victimisation). CSEW methodology remained consistent during this period, allowing
comparison between yearly data sets. To ensure consistency in the ranking of neighbourhood
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crime and disorder, only data from England were included2. These data were combined to
form a working data set of 139,515 respondents describing 3,325 violent victimisations
against 2,734 respondents. Following convention, only the respondent’s most recent violent




The outcome variable was crime labelling. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which
they regarded the violent incident as a crime or not a crime. The variable was derived from a
survey item wherein respondents indicated whether they regarded the incident as ‘Just
something that happens’, ‘Wrong, but not a crime’ and ‘A crime’. From this, a binary variable
‘A crime’ (1)/ ‘Not a crime’ (0) was created.
Impact
As suggested by Ruback et al. (1984), victim perceptions of the seriousness of a crime are
likely to be informed by the incident’s harmfulness (injury, weapon use and emotional
harm), its perceived injustice (unjustness of the incident, number of offenders, victim
initiation of the incident and attribution of reason for the incident) and the victim’s
subsequent feelings of vulnerability (victim feelings of vulnerability).
2 The same criteria for assessing neighbourhood crime and disorder in England and Wales, but the
deciles produced with these data separate English and Welsh areas. It was not possible to determine
the appropriateness of merging these variables, so the Welsh data were excluded.
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Harm
Incident harm was explored from three perspectives: physical harm, emotional harm and
potential for harm, represented by injury, emotional harm and weapon present,
respectively.
Injury. Whether the incident resulted in an injury to the respondent was coded as a binary
variable in response to the question: “Were you bruised, scratched, cut or injury in any
way?”. Affirmative responses were coded as 1.
Emotional harm. Tied to the physical seriousness of an incident is the emotional harm of the
incident. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent of any emotional response to the
incident. A four-point ordinal scale was created reflecting, in increasing order to harm: ‘No
emotional reaction’ (1); ‘Just a little’ (2); ‘Quite a lot’ (3); ‘Very much’ (4).
Weapon present. The use of a weapon has been cited as one of the key factors that influence
the perceived and actual seriousness of an assault (Brennan, 2011; Brennan et al., 2010).
While the mechanism through which this occurs is not firmly understood, it has been
proposed that this is due to the potential threat to life that weapon use presents (Weaver and
Clum, 1995). A binary variable was created in response to the question, “Did the person have
a weapon?”. Affirmative responses were coded as 1.
Unjustness of the incident
The unjustness of the incident was measured by the number of assailants, whether the victim
attributed the reason for the incident to some characteristic of themselves and whether the
victim initiated the violence. These variables were selected as they reflect unfairness and
discrimination in the characteristics of the incident.
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Number of offenders. Respondents indicated how many people were involved in assaulting
them. This was categorised as ‘one’ or ‘more than one’.
Victim initiation of the incident. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they “used
force first”. This was a binary, Yes/No response.
Attribution of reason for the incident. In response to the question, “Can you tell me why you
think this incident happened?”, twelve options were available, to which respondents could
indicate more than one reason. To reflect respondent vulnerability, a binary variable was
created and coded as ‘Yes’ if the respondent reported that the incident happened because
respondent negligence, respondent was specifically targeted, the respondent was a
geographically easy target or the incident was a hate crime. All other explanations for the
offence including not knowing why the incident happened were coded as ‘No’.
Perceived future vulnerability
Respondents were asked to rate their fear of walking alone in their neighbourhood at night.
This measure is widely used as a proxy for fear of victimisation (Gray et al., 2008). Victims
can respond along a four-point ordinal scale ranging from “Very safe” to “Very unsafe”.
While this is a valid measure of an individual’s feelings of vulnerability, its cross-sectional
nature limits its use as a measure of change in these feelings in response to victimisation. In
addition, if a victim feels vulnerable in response to domestic violence, it is unlikely to be
reflected in this variable.
Crime prototypicality
Crime prototypicality was explored through the use of two variables, relational distance
(victim-offender relationship) and experience of violence (number of violent victimisations
reported).
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Relational distance. Respondents were asked if the violence against them was committed by
a person or persons they knew (Yes/No). If the respondent knew any of their assailants, they
were asked to categorise their relationship with these individuals. Prior to the analyses, these
relationships were grouped as (1) family member/intimate partner, (2) friend/acquaintance
or neighbour or (3) other, resulting in an indicator of relational distance in increasing order
of distance.
Number of violent victimisations reported. Respondents were asked to recall how many
times they had been victims of violence in the past year. This count variable was recoded as a
three-part ordinal variable with categorised as ‘one’, ‘two’ or ‘three or more assaults’.
Neighborhood clustering effects
Given that likelihood of reporting crime to the police has been shown to be correlated within
US neighbourhoods (Baumer, 2002), it is possible that the area in which a person lives may
influence their attitudes towards the crimeworthiness of violent victimisation. Such a trend
could reflect general attitudes towards the use of formal and informal social control as noted
in a range of communities (e.g. Anderson, 1999; Ellickson, 1991). Therefore, the
neighbourhood in which a respondent lived was used to cluster respondents and national
measures of deprivation and crime within these neighbourhoods was used to determine the
effect of exposure to these factors on crime labelling.
Neighbourhoods. Respondents were clustered at the Lower Layer Super-output Area
(LSOA), which corresponds to between 400 and 1,200 households (Minimum population
1,000 – Maximum population 3,000). All LSOAs in England (n=32,842) were eligible for
inclusion in the study.
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Neighbourhood deprivation and crime. Neighbourhood characteristics were also included in
the model to test the hypothesis that individuals living in higher crime areas would be less
likely to label violence as a crime. LSOAs were ranked into deciles by the Office for National
Statistics based on a composite of number of reported violent crimes, burglaries, thefts and
cases of criminal damage per 1,000 at risk population (Communities and Local Government,
2011). This variable was reversed so that higher decile reflected greater levels of
neighbourhood crime and disorder. Then, neighbourhoods in deciles nine and ten were
recategorised as high crime areas.
Statistical methods
Multilevel logistic regression analyses were undertaken to identify predictors of a binary
variable, ‘crime labelling’. A hierarchical structure was employed because it was theorised
that attitudes towards crime may be correlated within neighbourhoods. The use of a
multilevel modelling strategy counteracts the effect of clustering on the standard errors of
the regression estimates. Failure to account for this clustering increases the risk of Type I
errors. Furthermore, it allows the estimation of how much of the variability in crime labelling
can be attributed to neighbourhoods and, because different mechanisms may be active in
different neighbourhoods, allows the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables to vary between neighbourhoods.
Analyses were first run as second-order penalised quasi-likelihood models (PQL2). Analyses
were conducted using the runmlwin (Leckie and Charlton, 2012) command for Stata 13,
which runs the MLwiN 2.26 programme (Rabash et al., 2012) within Stata.
Four models were run. Firstly, an intercepts-only model (Model I) was run to estimate the
individual and neighbourhood effects without any predictor variables. A single-level logit
regression with standard errors adjusted for neighbourhood clustering (Model II). Model III
was a multilevel model with individual-level predictor variables constrained as fixed effects.
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In model IV, a neighbourhood-level variable, level of neighbourhood crime and disorder, was
included as a random effect.
The analyses produced odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) of each variable.
In order to describe the effect of neighbourhood on crime labelling, two indicators of inter-
neighbourhood variance were calculated. The variance partition coefficient (VPC) –
analogous to the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient – is a percentage estimate of the extent of
similarity within neighbourhoods (Browne, Subramanian, Jones and Goldstein, 2005) and
the Median Odds Ratio (MOR) is an indicator of the median change in likelihood of crime
labelling when comparing two randomly selected neighbourhoods.
As is typical of many multilevel models of nationally-representative social surveys, within-
neighbourhood sampling was sparse (Bell, 2008). As multi-level models aggregate variance
at the case and cluster levels (in this case, individuals and neighbourhoods, respectively), it is
important to consider the effect that the low levels of clustering might have on variance
calculations. Researchers in this context are often forced to decide between the use of
smaller cluster units (e.g. LSOAs) which better represent neighbourhoods (Fone et al., 2007)
or larger cluster units (e.g. Middle Layer Super Output Areas), which have less sparseness,
but are worse proxies for neighbourhood. In this case, the benefit of using MSOAs was
negligible, so the more representative indicator of neighbourhood, LSOA, was preferred.
An early rule of thumb has recommended approximately 20 cases per cluster (Hox, 1998) to
avoid an inflated risk of Type I errors. However, more recent simulation studies with more
sparsely-distributed samples have found low levels of statistical bias, with low number of
clusters being more problematic than high sparseness (Bell, 2008). Furthermore, the
proportion of ‘singletons’ (i.e. level 2 units with a solitary level 1 unit) in the simulation
studies did not affect the estimation of fixed or random effects when the number of clusters
exceeded 500. Nevertheless, the sparseness of the data modelled in the current study
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exceeds those simulated by Bell and colleagues (2007; 2008). To be confident that
sparseness did not adversely bias the model coefficients and reported variances, alternative
models with lower sparseness but smaller sample sizes were also created by limiting the
sample to neighbourhoods with at least two respondents. These alternative models were
used for confirmatory purposes only and the models reported below were based upon the full
sample.
Missing values
Missing values can adversely affect the generalisability of study findings, particularly if data
are missing for a systematic reason, e.g. a refusal by respondents to answer intrusive
questions. Through casewise deletion, the inclusion of predictor variables resulted in a 4.8%
loss of cases. Logistic regression failed to find any predictor of missing cases. Therefore, it
was determined that these cases were unlikely to affect the validity of the results.
Results
Of the 2,729 respondents (99.8% of the eligible sample) who described violence against
them, 64.8% labelled the incident as a crime. Descriptive statistics for the variables are
featured in Table 1, including a measure of association (chi-square test) between the variable
and the outcome (‘crime labelling’).
Table 1 about here
Model I: An ‘intercepts only’ model was run to determine whether likelihood of labelling
violence as a crime was clustered within neighbourhoods. This ‘null model’ reported a level 2
variance of 0.025 (Standard error 0.11) and a VPC of 0.008, which indicated that
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neighbourhood explained less than 1% of the variance in the outcome 3. The median odds
ratio for this model was 1.16.
Model II: In the presence of small group size within clusters, the results of the logistic
regression analysis are presented to permit examination of the consistency between single-
and multilevel models. As the estimates are almost identical across models, the findings of
the multilevel model are reported in detail.
Model III: A fixed-effects model, controlling for neighbourhood-level effects was run to
determine the relationship between the predictor and outcome variables while adjusting
standard errors for the effect of clustering within neighbourhoods. In the model, the ‘harm’
variables, weapon use, injury and emotional damage predicted crime labelling, although the
relationship between the outcome and level of emotional harm was non-linear (Hypothesis
1). Use of a weapon approximately increased the likelihood of the incident being labelled a
crime by a factor of two. Injury increased the likelihood of the incident being labelled a crime
by 71%. There was no difference in likelihood of labelling violence as a crime if the
respondent felt that they suffered ‘just a little’ emotional harm compared to those victims
who did not report an emotional reaction to the incident, but respondents who indicated that
they were “quite a lot” or “very much” affected by the incident were three times and almost
seven times more likely to label the violence as a crime, respectively. Labelling was more
likely among respondents who reported multiple assailants or attributed the reason for the
incident to some characteristic of themselves (Hypothesis 2). Relational distance was also a
statistically significant predictors of crime labelling although the relationships was non-
linear (Hypothesis 4). Respondents were just as likely to discount violence against them by
friends, neighbours and work colleagues as they were to violence by family members or








2, where σu2 is the variance of the constant for the random effects part of
the model (Snijders and Bosker, 1999).
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known acquaintances compared to violence by family members or intimate partners.
Reporting more than one other violent victimisation was associated with a 20% lower
likelihood of labelling violence as a crime (Hypothesis 5). Fear of walking along at night was
not related to labelling (Hypothesis 3). Finally, those living in high-crime neighbourhoods
were more likely to label violence as a crime compared to those living in low-crime
neighbourhoods (Hypothesis 7).
The introduction of the level 1 predictor variables led to a small decrease in VPC for level-2
effects and the MOR4 remained constant, indicating that the addition of these variables
decreased the ability of the multilevel model to explain between-neighbourhood variation.
The fact that these were individual-level variables, suggests that the between-neighbourhood
variation in the propensity for labelling violence as a crime is low (Hypothesis 6).
In order to further test hypothesis 7, neighbourhood crime rates were introduced as a
random coefficient in Model IV. The inclusion of neighbourhood crime rates as a random
coefficient would allow the model to detect differences in the relationship between the
outcome and the predictor variables depending on the level of crime in the areas. However,
the inclusion of this variable as a random coefficient did not improve the predictive ability of
the model – as evidenced by the reduction in VPC and MOR statistics – and individual-level
estimates remained largely constant across models. Therefore, it was concluded that
neighbourhood level of crime did not affect the relationship between the outcome and
predictor variables.
Table 2 about here
Accounting for sparseness in clustering
4 ܯ ܱܴ = exp(0.95൫√σu2൯)
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There were an average of 1.1 respondents per neighbourhood. This represents considerable
‘sparseness’, meaning that in a large number of neighbourhoods, the group mean would be
identical to the individual score, thus resulting in a neighbourhood-level variance of 0. While
Bell et al.(2008) have suggested that large numbers of ‘singletons’ (clusters containing a
single case) are unlikely to present a problem for the validity of model estimates, their
position is based on simulation studies with less sparseness and fewer clusters. Clarke and
Mayhew (2007) have also found that a sparseness of 2 cases per group is not associated with
biased fixed effects estimates. Therefore, an alternative sample was generated that only
included cases with more than one respondent per neighbourhood. This alternative sample
consisted of 502 cases nested within 234 neighbourhoods (Average 2.1, Min 2, Max 4).
Models I-IV were re-run using this alternative sample. Considering the differences between
the models alongside the changes in the Model II estimates, it appears that any differences
between the estimates using the full and restricted samples were the result of sampling
variation rather than bias created through sparseness.
Discussion
This study provides the first exploration of the circumstances under which victims regard
violence against them as a crime. Given its exploratory nature, the study took a broad range
of theoretically-informed individual, contextual and ecological factors into consideration.
This study identifies a number of factors that contribute to a victim’s decision to label a
violent incident against them as a crime and it has identified a number of characteristics of
violence that make victims less likely to regard the incident as a crime. The findings of this
research have demonstrated that the model provided by Ruback et al. is a valuable
framework for understanding victim attitudinal responses to violence and that Black’s theory
of ‘morphology’ is relevant even when a decision about crime has no real-world
consequences. In addition, the study found that neighbourhood effects on crime labelling are
minimal, which can be tentatively interpreted to indicate that the social norms that have
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been shown to affect reporting behaviour (Baumer, 2002) are not reflected in individual’s
personally-held beliefs about the criminal nature of violence.
Predictors of the labelling and discounting of violence
As hypothesised, impact played a fundamental role in the decision to label violence as a
crime. The findings provide support for the model proposed by Ruback et al. (1984), which
extends the concept of harm beyond psychological or physical injury to incorporate the
victim’s future vulnerability and the ‘unjustness’ of the incident in the construct of impact.
Victims’ attributing the incident to some characteristic of themselves and the unjustness of
being assaulted by more than one person, and the strong relationship between discounting
and respondent initiation of the violence, demonstrate that impact should constitute the
future as well as past impact of crime. The lack of a statistically significant relationship
between fear of crime and crime labelling should not preclude feelings of vulnerability from
future analysis of victim responses. The cross-sectional nature of the data set prevented
change in fear of crime from being measured and this is an area that should be investigated
further while the measurement of fear of crime is notoriously difficult.
Independent of the impact of the incident, it appears that the decision to discount violence
was greatly influenced by the relationship between the victim and the offender(s), although
this relationship was non-linear, with violence by relatives and acquaintances equally likely
to be discounted. Victims were twice as likely to regard violence by a non-acquaintance as a
crime compared to violence by a family member or partner. This strengthens the support for
Black’s (1976) ‘morphology’ theory that use of law is proportional to relational distance
between victim and offender. While on one hand providing support for a component of
Black’s theory of law, the findings of this study demonstrate the limitations of Black’s “pure
sociology” approach to this phenomenon (1993: 159). In this approach, there is no place for
individual decision-making or psychological factors. However, taken alongside the weak
effect of neighbourhood, it is reasonable to surmise that the observed effect of ‘morphology’
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is a bottom-up effect, with individuals making decisions about labelling based on rational
decisions about interpersonal cooperation rather being influenced by downward social
pressure to avoid formal methods of social control.
In support of the ‘normalisation’ hypothesis at the individual level, number of reported
assaults was associated with discounting violence. At the neighbourhood level, contrary to
hypothesis six, there was only weak evidence of clustering in response to victimisation.
Furthermore, neighbourhood crime and disorder – hypothesised to predict crime
discounting through the mechanism of promoting anti-authoritarian attitudes – had little
impact on discounting.
These findings indicate that decisions about crime are informed by personal and context-
specific factors rather than social or structural processes. Importantly, this finding about
attitudes towards violence lies contrary to findings about crime reporting that indicates an
effect of neighbourhood on this behaviour (Baumer, 2002). Taken together, it suggests that
anti-authoritarian attitudes in areas that tend towards informal use of social control are
enforced at the neighbourhood level rather than being engrained in individual attitudes.
Therefore, normalisation, at least in terms of responding to crime, is a mechanism that
operates at the individual level rather than the social.
As a methodological and cautionary note, the diagnostic tests (Appendix One) demonstrate
the small group sizes employed in this study did not bias the estimates. However, it is
unlikely that, all 80% of respondents who were the sole representatives of victims of violence
in their neighbourhood were archetypal of those populations. Therefore, the findings relating
to neighbourhood effects should be interpreted with caution. As the sample of CSEW
respondents increases over time it will become possible to use larger average group sizes
wherein groups are more representative of victims of violence in their neighbourhoods.
Although it have its own methodological issues relating to changes in neighbourhood
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characteristics over long periods of time, the hypotheses of this study could be retested when
larger group sizes become available.
Making sense of crime discounting
The observation that 35% of the violent incidents included in the study were not regarded as
crimes demonstrates that some violence is acceptable to some people. Therefore, it is
important to ask of crime discounting – what is in it for the victims? This can be examined
from several different perspectives. By discounting the criminal nature of crime against
them, the victim simultaneously expresses resilience, seizes control over the incident and
prevents state involvement in their victimisation.
By discounting violence, victims exercise their ability to ignore the law while also
contributing to the phenomenology of crime and legality. Robinson (2000) has asserted that
“the extent of criminal law’s moral authority determines the extent of its ability to shape
community norms and to influence people’s conduct through normative forces” (p. 1840).
Therefore, by refusing to acknowledge violence as a crime, the victim undermines the
credibility of law as a moral code. In their study of ‘everyday law’, Ewick and Silbey noted
that “every time a person interprets some event in terms of legal concepts or terminology –
whether to applaud or to criticize, whether to appropriate or to resist – legality is produced
(p. 45)”. Therefore, the discounting of violence by victims is an example of individuals
exercising and constructing the law that exists in their everyday lives.
The normalisation process described above is just one approach to understanding how
victims manage their experience of violence. It is quite likely that, rather than being
normatively-informed, crime labelling and discounting may have instrumental purposes.
While discounting can be seen as an attempt to exercise self-presentation and autonomy, it
could also be viewed as a post hoc attempt to protect one’s self. An alternative explanation of
the discounting phenomenon is that the respondent did indeed regard the incident as a
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crime, but employed some cognitive technique to neutralise it. Reasons for this could include
a desire to avoid a ‘victim’ identity or to avoid facing up to an unjust, unpredictable world
(Agnew, 1985). Taylor et al. (1983) have suggested that a victim, in an effort to protect the
ego from the unpleasant condition of victimhood, may re-evaluate and minimise the
seriousness or significance of the victimisation. Adapting Sykes and Matza’s (1957) analysis
of delinquents’ rationalising of their criminal behaviour, Agnew (1985) collated evidence that
victims can activate a range of neutralising techniques in order to discount and
reconceptualise the effect and meaning of their victimisation. Such techniques have been
observed by researchers studying domestic abuse (Mills, 1985) and sexual violence (Frazier
and Burnett, 1994; Weiss, 2011). However, they do not appear to have been investigated in
terms of more common interpersonal violence, nor does there appear to have been an
investigation into the influence of setting or context on these outcomes. Unfortunately, it was
not possible to explore this neutralisation phenomenon further using the existing survey
questions and it remains a potentially valuable avenue of exploration. It should be
remembered that the processes of normalisation and neutralisation are not mutually
exclusive and, so, how these two processes interact could be a valuable area of research on
victim responses to violence.
Study limitations
This study has a number of limitations that must be considered when interpreting the
results. Firstly, the components of the incident, including harm, morphology and
neighbourhood clustering were measured and analysed through proxy measures, which
limits their validity. For example, the variable that referred to victim perceptions of
vulnerability may reflect generalised social insecurity rather than individual feelings of fear,
which might explain why it was not a statistically significant predictor of the outcome. The
weak validity of variables measuring victim perceptions of a phenomenon is a constant
limitation of victimological research that seeks to test theoretical explanations of victim
behaviour. Future studies could explore these findings qualitatively, generating greater
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insight into the motivations and explanations that victims give for their labelling and
discounting behaviour. Encouragingly, the quantitatively-informed findings of this study are
consistent with more in-depth, qualitative work with small samples of victims, thus
triangulating and strengthening the validity of the findings. Secondly, the context in which
the data were collected may have some relevance. Respondents will have been aware that
they were responding to questions as part of a ‘crime survey’. This may have primed them to
be more crime-focused in their responses, leading some to re-evaluate their beliefs about the
incident in a more authoritarian way. Thirdly, the term ‘victim’ is not clearly defined. In this
context, the ‘victim’ is simply someone who experienced violence and was asked to complete
a survey: whether they had some culpability for its occurrence was not considered. The
findings indicate that respondent initiation of the incident was a statistically significant
predictor of discounting, suggesting that the antecedents of the incident play an important
role in the construction of crime. While Ellickson’s and Anderson’s studies focused on tactics
for conflict resolution, the current study focuses on conflict discounting and does not seek to
explore how or whether the respondents acted in response to the violence. In that sense, the
present analysis is somewhat unsophisticated as it removes much of the precipitatory and
residual context of the incident. As Black (1983) has noted, much violence is an attempt to
regain or exercise control and so, to be fully understood, violent incidents should be
examined in the context of their antecedents and sequelae. Importantly, the present study
does not aim to study the way in which the incident was resolved. The resolution of the
incident, if the conflict was resolved at all in the eyes of the respondent, may have influenced
their later labelling of the incident. The survey, which only collects data on official resolution
of the incident – which will inevitably covary with labelling – does not permit the exploration
of the effect of informal conflict resolution on crime labelling. In the language of Pigliaru
(1970), the focus is on the omerta, but not the vendetta.
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Conclusion
The identification of factors that predict the discounting of violence as criminal
demonstrates that victims, independent of the harm caused, consider a number of contextual
factors before they decide that something is criminal. Hulsman (1986), Young (1988) and
Hough and Mayhew (1983) – each approaching the phenomenon of victimhood from
different perspectives – have all noted inconsistencies in response to victimisation. However,
this is the first time that such predictors have been identified while controlling for the level
of harm associated with the incident.
It is inevitable that not all violence is a crime and to argue that all violence should be
regarded as such would be naïve. However, this study has demonstrated the potential for
many victims to discount serious offences against them and serves to emphasise that many
victims are unaware of their legal position or are unwilling or unable to seek help. A corollary
of this is that there is an even greater number of unidentified victims of crime than
previously estimated. Whether the mechanism for this is normalisation, neutralisation or
otherwise is not as important as the need to ensure that victims are aware of their right to
protection from violence and are aware of the services available to ensure their wellbeing.
The statistical analyses used have allowed the identification of risk factors while controlling
for the direct harm suffered. Therefore, the study shows that, regardless of harm inflicted,
victims still do not label violence as a crime when it is caused by someone they know well.
This suggests a problem that is even more deeply-engrained than the behavioural issue of
not reporting this violence to the police as it compounds a behavioural problem with an
attitudinal one. Therefore, organisations who work with victims should not just focus on
changing victim behaviour, such as facilitating reporting, but they should also focus on
changing the mindset of victims and the public.
This paper has not sought to postulate about the legitimacy or rightness of labelling or
discounting crime; it has merely been an attempt to understand the factors that influence
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how legality is constructed in the minds of victims and how it is produced between actors.
The impact of the incident on the victim is the most important factor in crime labelling and is
composed of at least the harm experienced and the unjustness of the incident. It remains to
be seen whether the effect of the incident on individual feelings of vulnerability contribute to
this construct. In addition, the extent to which something is regarded as a crime is depleted
by repeated exposure and familiarity with the perpetrator. Finally, it is evident that victims
interpret the ‘crimeworthiness’ of an incident at an individual level that is largely
independent of social pressures or the normalising effects of exposure to crime at a
neighbourhood level.
This study has shown that people respond to victimisation in systematically biased ways.
Illuminating the contextual factors that interact with harm and impact to construct ‘crime’ in
the mind of a victim can help explain implicit rules about the use of social control and the
acceptability of harm among the general population. Furthermore, at a more practical level,
identifying variations in the construction of crime can provide insight into such diverse
criminological issues as police ascertainment of crime, predictors of repeat victimisation, the
democratic processes that influence changes in criminal law and allow us to recognise a
population of victims beyond those who do not report to the police. Further research,
particularly into the effect of specific ‘lawless’ situations, such as barrooms or war zones, may
shed more light on the contextual aspects of victims’ complex responses to violence.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable N % of sample χ2
Incident labelled as a crime 1,769 64.8 .
Incident impact
Victim injured 1,753 64.3 66.04***
Weapon used 365 14.01 40.67***
Emotional impact 230.84***
No emotional response 364 13.68
Just a little 946 35.56
Quite a lot 674 25.34
Very much 676 25.41
More than one assailant 783 29.98 38.12***
Number of assaults 15.23***
One 1,954 71.47
Two 354 12.95
Three or more 426 15.58
Victim initiation of violence 64 2.46 13.19***
Incident attributed to victim characteristic 293 10.74 17.25***
Fear of walking alone after dark 35.17***
Very safe 896 32.88
Fairly safe 978 35.89
A bit unsafe 569 20.88




Family member/intimate partner 484 17.74
Friend/acquaintance or neighbour 416 15.24
Other 1,829 67.02
Number of assaults 15.23***
One 1,954 71.47
Two 354 12.95
Three or more 426 15.58
Neighbourhood crime and disorder 7.49**
High crime and disorder 678 24.80
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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Table 2. Results of multilevel logistic regression analyses
Model I Model II Model II Model III
Measures of association (Odds ratios) Odds 95% CI Odds 95% CI Odds (95% CI) Odds (99% CrI)
Individual-level variables
Constant 1.85 (1.71–2.00)*** 0.22 (0.14–0.34)*** 0.21 (0.14–0.34)*** 0.21 (0.13–0.34)***
Weapon 1.91 (1.42–2.56)*** 1.92 (1.43–2.58)*** 1.89 (1.41–2.54)***
Injury 1.71 (1.42–2.05)*** 1.71 (1.43–2.06)*** 1.71 (1.42–2.05)***
Emotional harm
(compared to no emotional response)
Just a little 1.08 (0.83–1.41) 1.08 (0.83–1.41) 1.09 (0.84–1.42)
Quite a lot 2.72 (2.03–3.66)*** 2.74 (2.04–3.67)*** 2.76 (2.06–3.70)***
Very much 5.60 (4.02–7.77)*** 5.64 (4.05–7.86)*** 5.73 (4.11–7.98)***
More than one assailant 1.52 (1.23–1.88)*** 1.53 (1.23–1.89)*** 0.79 (0.65–0.97)***
Relational distance
(compared to family member/intimate partner)
Friend/acquaintance or neighbour 1.11 (0.82–1.51) 1.11 (0.81–1.52) 1.11 (0.81–1.52)
Other 1.77 (1.36–2.31)*** 1.78 (1.36–2.32)*** 1.78 (1.37–2.33)***
Incident attributed to victim characteristic 1.34 (0.98–1.83) 1.34 (0.97–1.84) 1.35 (0.98–1.85)
More than one reported violent victimisation 0.79 (0.65–0.97)* 0.79 (0.65–0.97)* 0.79 (0.65–0.97)*
Fear of victimisation 1.09 (0.99–1.21) 1.10 (0.99–1.20) 1.07 (0.97–1.19)
Victim initiation of violence 0.40 (0.23–0.69)*** 0.39 (0.22–0.69)*** 0.39 (0.22–0.69)***
Neighbourhood-level variables
High crime and disorder 1.23 (1.00–1.53)
Measures of clustering
Level 2 variance (standard error) 0.025 (0.11) - 0.024 (0.13) 0.016 (0.14)
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Variance Partition Coefficient 0.008 - 0.007 0.005
Median odds ratio 1.16 - 1.16 1.13
Model characteristics
Observations 2729 2496 2496 2496




Diagnostic comparison analyses using less sparse samples
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Measures of association (Odds ratios) Odds (95% CI) Odds (95% CI) Odds (95% CI) Odds (99% CI)
Individual-level variables
Constant 1.78 (1.47–2.13)*** 0.13 (0.05–0.40)*** 0.13 (0.04–0.41)*** 0.11 (0.03–0.36)***
Weapon 1.89 (0.85–4.22) 1.90 (0.91–3.97) 1.80 (0.85–3.80)
Injury 2.50 (1.63–3.82)*** 2.50 (1.59–3.95)*** 2.55 (1.61–4.04)***
Emotional harm
(compared to no emotional response)
Just a little 1.13 (0.58–2.18) 1.13 (0.59–2.16) 1.19 (0.61–2.31)
Quite a lot 2.71 (1.33–5.53)** 2.72 (1.33–5.53)** 2.84 (1.38–5.83)**
Very much 9.73 (4.13–22.92)*** 9.77 (4.19–22.77)*** 10.28 (4.36–24.28)***
More than one assailant 1.90 (1.15–3.16)* 1.90 (1.12–3.26)* 1.87 (1.08–3.22)*
Relational distance
(compared to family member/intimate partner)
Friend/acquaintance or neighbour 0.93 (0.47–1.83) 0.93 (0.44–1.94) 0.89 (0.42–1.89)
Other 1.72 (0.90–3.26) 1.71 (0.92–3.21) 1.72 (0.91–3.25)
Incident attributed to victim characteristic 2.99 (1.26–7.13)* 3.00 (1.20–7.49)* 3.07 (1.21–7.76)*
More than one reported violent victimisation 0.48 (0.30–0.77)** 0.48 (0.29–0.77)**
Fear of victimisation 1.08 (0.87–1.35) 1.08 (0.85–1.37) 1.03 (0.80–1.32)
Victim initiation of violence 0.60 (0.14–2.67) 0.60 (0.14–2.60) 0.61 (0.14–2.66)
Neighbourhood-level variables
High crime and disorder 1.34 (0.77–2.33)
Measures of clustering
Level 2 variance 0.07 (0.19) 0.01 (0.24) -
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Variance Partition Coefficient 0.02 0.003 -
Median odds ratio 1.29 1.10 -
Model characteristics
Observations 502 464 464
% change in variance - - -93 -
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
The sample was limited to those LSOAs with group size greater than 1; average group size = 2.1, Min 1, Max 4
